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ABSTRACT
East Asia has been experiencing an epic progress of regionalism over 
the last decade with China, Japan, and Korea (CJK) as the most prominent 
actors. Regionally speaking, East Asia has been nurtured by a market-driven 
expansion of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) that leads the bottom-
up regionalism process. However, this paper argues that the bottom-up process 
alone is not enough since a more institutionalized approach is needed. From a 
static panel data simulation, it is found that sound transportation infrastruc-
ture, good governance, competitive taxation policies, sizeable markets, good 
education, democracy and the trend towards industrialization are the main 
factors that serve as building blocks for East Asian regionalism. 
Keywords: regionalism, panel data, East Asia, trade 
JEL Clasification: C33, R13, N15.
Los determinantes del regionalismo de Asia Oriental
RESUMEN
Asia oriental ha experimentado un progreso épico del regionalismo en 
la última década, con China, Japón y Corea (CJK), como los actores más des-
tacados. Regionalmente hablando, Asia oriental ha sido alimentado por una 
expansión impulsada por el mercado del comercio y la inversión extranjera 
directa (IED) que lidera el proceso de regionalismo, de abajo hacia arriba. Sin 
embargo, este trabajo sostiene que el proceso de abajo hacia arriba por sí solo 
no es suficiente, ya que se necesita un enfoque más institucional. Desde un 
panel de simulación estática de datos, se comprueba que la infraestructura 
de transporte, el buen gobierno, políticas de competencia fiscal, los mercados 
de gran envergadura, buena educación, la democracia y la tendencia hacia 
la industrialización son los principales factores que sirven como bloques de 
construcción para el regionalismo de asia oriental.
Palabras clave: regionalismo, data panel, asia oriental, comercio
Clasificación JEL: C33, R13, N15.
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INTRODUCTION
East Asian countries cannot escape from the fact 
that they are now being more integrated than 
before. Regionally speaking, East Asia has been 
nurtured by a market-driven expansion of trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI). Kawai (2007) 
described the data of a heavily expanded trade and 
FDI in the region over the past two decades. 
The share of intraregional trade of ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT) has been increasing dramatically 
over the last decade. The share is now reaching a 
staggering figure as it almost reaches 60 per cent. 
In comparison with the figure in early nineties, it 
can be concluded that East Asia is becoming more 
interconnected, and all of these facts have led the 
well known bottom-up process of regionalism.
Unfortunately, the bottom up process alone 
is not enough. A more institutionalized approach 
is needed in order to make the regionalism solid 
and sustainable. Although the leaders of ASEAN+3 
countries have repeatedly held meetings, the top-
down process in East Asia has still not reached its 
potentials. It is fair to say that, as Capannelli (2011) 
argues, the increased economic interdependence in 
East Asia over the last few decades has been heavily 
dominated by the markets rather than government 
policies. Coordinated intergovernmental initiatives 
for cooperation, including the creation of regional 
institutions, have lagged behind. Different from 
Europe, economic integration in Asia has emerged 
without a clear strategy for creating a unity across 
the countries in the region (Asian Development 
Bank, ADB, 2008; Drysdale, 2006; Kawai, 2005; 
Petri, 2006; Soesastro, 2006).
 Feng and Genna (2003) argued that homo-
geneity of domestic institutions is needed to go 
together with the regional integration process. 
Moreover, they pointed out inflation, taxation and 
government regulation as representing factors for 
the economic institutions. Another variable that 
might enhance integration is population, as al-
ready identified by Tamura (1995). He argued that 
large population is a catalyst for integration due 
to economic agglomeration. Scholars like Milner 
and Kubota (2005) even pointed out democracy as 
an important factor that could foster regionalism. 
Their empirical work on the developing countries 
from 1970 to 1999 showed that regime change 
toward democracy was associated with trade li-
beralization and regionalization. 
Based on the aforementioned, knowing the 
factors that determine the formation of regio-
nalism (top-down process to match the existing 
bottom-up process) is becoming more and more 
crucial. Given this fact, this chapter tries to iden-
tify the variables that provide a clear path for the 
formation of East Asian Regionalism (EAR). Thus, a 
unified East Asia could accelerate the momentum 
of overall trade liberalization and boost regional 
economic growth.
The last part of this chapter is organized 
as follows. The second section studies the basic 
concepts. The third section covers materials and 
methods. The fourth section examines the results, 
and the last section presents some concluding 
remarks.
BASIC CONCEPTS
Democracy and regionalism
Many scholars believe that the types of regime can 
influence the choice to join or not to join the free 
trade scheme. However, whether or not democracy 
promotes free trade still finds some ambiguous 
arguments among scholars. Given the global 
trend toward democracy, the answer is of more 
than pedagogical interest. If democracy indeed 
promotes free trade, then the spread of democracy 
should reinforce regionalism, because it creates a 
path to open the markets for poor countries that 
have historically lacked market access. However, if 
democracy can lead to protection, the formation 
of regionalism will face substantial problem. Either 
way, understanding and predicting the future of 
regionalism requires an understanding of the de-
mocracy and trade policy relationship.
Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that de-
mocratization, which implies a size increase in the 
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selectorate, have a direct consequence in changing 
the calculations of political leaders about the opti-
mal level of trade barriers. They see that democra-
tization induces the adoption of trade policies that 
better promote the welfare of consumers/voters at 
large, which implies trade liberalization in this con-
text. Although the interest of protectionist groups 
remain important as the dynamic of democracies, 
other groups preferring lower trade barriers beco-
me more important for political leaders since they 
are now part of the selectorate upon which leaders 
can depend for their political survival.
The work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
on the political economy of protection tells so-
mewhat a different story compared to the aforesaid. 
They argue that if rational policymakers (govern-
ment, parliament) maximize a weighted sum of 
campaign contributions and general welfare, the 
equilibrium tariff depends on the relative weights 
placed on each one in the government’s objective 
function. To the extent that special interest groups 
are more active in a democracy (Olson, 1982), they 
might constitute a greater weight, and therefore 
a greater level of democracy would lead to higher 
trade barriers. Conversely, political competition 
generated in an active democracy might imply 
that policymakers weight more heavily −in gene-
ral− versus special interest welfare. These models 
are silent as to which influence might dominate; 
however, empirical work testing the protection for 
sale model has yielded results that are supportive 
of a positive linkage between democracy and trade 
(Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubasoglu, 2002).
To simulate the logic, the study goes through 
the juggernaut and Domino framework which was 
first introduced by Baldwin (2006). Although it is 
known best for explaining the behavior of exporter 
and importer, it also serves well when it comes to 
politics. The main similarity would be the involve-
ment of actors that seek a politically optimal point 
(equilibrium point). Those actors are:(a) policy 
makers, (b) anti free-trade actors, and (c) pro-trade 
actors. Moving on to the scenario where anti free-
trade actors have dominant lobbying power that 
influences the whole system, pro-trade actors will 
try their best to ensure their activities stay safe. To 
do so, the anti free-trade actors need to lobby the 
policy makers to impose high tariff by reciprocally 
giving the policy makers bigger sound prognosis 
of consumer welfare. Naturally, the pro-trade ac-
tivists would resist any kind of tariff hikes. For the 
anti trade actors, the given characteristic means 
lobbying cost. Since the first scenario assumes anti 
trade actors to have ample amount of resources 
to handle the cost, the policy makers will then be 
stirred to set cuts on sanction.
The number of anti trade actors is determi-
ned by a free entry condition which is a function of 
the tariff. Higher tariff rates will lead to increasing 
numbers of anti trade actors as they face lesser 
barriers to entry. The tariff itself is determined by 
the actions of policy makers when it optimizes a 
‘politically realistic objective function’. The objec-
tive function here is defined as way to maximize 
individual preferences. The intersection of a politi-
cally realistic objective function with the free-entry 
conditions provides a set of combinations where 
policy makers are choosing the politically-optimal 
rule while allowingthe anti trade actors to enter 
the game up to the point of no return.
Reciprocal talks (taking the form of negotia-
tion between anti trade actors and policy makers) 
will have a direct impact for a politically optimal 
tariff. This scenario will shift down the objective 
function of the policy makers since they have a 
new set of optimal rule. The shifting will −in turn− 
drive some pro-trade actors to be marginalized as 
they face increasing numbers of anti trade actors, 
which also means increasing lobbying power 
against them. This situation will decrease the cost 
of lobbying since the political resistance from the 
pro-trade actors is decreasing linearly with the le-
aping size of anti trade actors. As far as Baldwin’s 
juggernaut effect is concerned, the political eco-
nomy forces driving the effect are strengthened 
by the tendency of special interest groups to fight 
harder to secure gains. For them, joining the anti 
trade scheme will give new commercial opportu-
nities. Having said this, the higher tariff may play 
a particularly important role in generating new 
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anti-trade political economy activity. Doing ano-
ther reciprocal talk is cheaper now, resulting to 
further hikes on tariff. The cycle repeats itself until 
new equilibrium is met (the juggernaut effect). 
As Geddes (1995) summarizes:
 Until recently, it was widely accepted that 
democracies, especially fragile, uninstitutio-
nalized new democracies have difficulty ca-
rrying out economic liberalization because its 
costs make it unpopular and hence politically 
suicidal to elected officials. Consequently, 
it was argued, authoritarian governments 
should be more capable of initiating and 
sustaining major economic reforms.
The effects of democracy on trade can 
also be determined by the characteristics of the 
voters. In his work on the political economy of 
trade, Mayer (1984) produces interesting findings 
concerning the unique characteristics of voters by 
using the Heckscher-Ohlin framework (two factors 
and two sectors). The findings emphasize on the 
endowment of median voter. If the median voter is 
well-endowed with labor, they will support imports 
of capital intensive goods but oppose imports of 
labor-intensive goods. On the other hand, if the 
median voter is well endowed with capital relati-
ve to their national mean, then they will support 
imports of labor-intensive goods, but oppose 
imports of capital-intensive goods. To correspond 
with Mayer’s work, Dutt and Mitra (2002) explain 
that inequality raises trade barriers in capital rich 
countries and lowers them in capital scarce ones. 
Besides, left-wing governments adopt more protec-
tionist policies in capital-rich countries, but more 
free trade policies in labor-rich economies with 
right-wing governments.
Good governance and regionalism
Until recently, the development literature put 
some excessive study on the terms governance 
and good governance. Bad governance, as the 
antithesis of good governance, is often regarded 
as a major root that creates all sources of pro-
blem. Major donors and international financial 
institutions are increasingly basing their aid and 
loans on the condition that reforms ensuring 
good governance are undertaken.
The concept of governance is not new. It 
is as old as human civilization. According to the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (UnESCAP, 2010), gover-
nance means: the process of decision-making and 
the process by which decisions are implemented 
(or not implemented). Governance can be used in 
several contexts such as corporate governance, in-
ternational governance, national governance and 
local governance. Given the fact that governance 
is the process that involves decision-making and 
implementing, any analysis concerning gover-
nance should focus on the actors −formal and 
informal− that are drawn in the process. 
Bringing the concept to practicality, go-
vernment is deemed as one of the actors in go-
vernance. Other actors involved in governance 
vary depending on the level of government that 
is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, 
other actors may also include influential lan-
dlords, associations of peasant farmers, coope-
ratives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
research institutes, religious leaders, finance 
institutions, political parties, the military etc. The 
situation in urban areas is much more complex. 
At the national level, in addition to the actors 
above, media, lobbyists, international donors or 
multi-national corporations may play a role in 
decision-making or in influencing the decision-
making process.
All actors other than government and the 
military are put into one pot as a part of the ‘civil 
society.’ Although formal decisions are delivered 
and implemented at the national level by formal 
government structures, informal decision-making 
structures, such as ‘kitchen cabinets’ or informal 
advisors may exist. Corrupt practices are regarded 
as an influential factor determining such informal 
decision-making process.
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To be more specific, UnESCAP classifies good 
governance into eight (8) major characteristics. It 
is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. 
It assures that corruption is minimized, the views 
of minorities are taken into account and that the 
voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in 
decision-making. It is also responsive to the present 
and future needs of society. 
In the relation with regionalism, various 
studies have demonstrated that governance is 
crucial for regionalism. Adam Smith (1776) noted 
that private contracting is an important factor for 
the mutually beneficial exchanges that promote 
specialization, innovation and growth, which are 
also the main factors for the gains from free-trade 
leading to regionalism.
Bolaky and Freund (2004) demonstrate that 
regulatory quality influences the interaction bet-
ween trade and economic growth. They also argue 
that countries with excessive regulations do not 
get benefit from trade. The argument is relatively 
simple: Trade only benefits countries that have 
relatively low adjustment costs. In other words, 
countries that are facing low cost for reallocation 
of labor and capital −from the import-competing 
sector to the exports sector− will get high benefit 
from trade. On the other hand, countries with too 
much regulation may face a relatively rigid econo-
mic structure. In this case, production factors are 
facing difficulties in moving to the sectors where 
large welfare gains can be achieved. The economy 
may eventually end-up in a situation where trade 
does not have a beneficial impact on the allo-
cation of resources within and between sectors. 
Furthermore, excessive regulations may encourage 
a country to produce goods for which it has no 
comparative advantage or the terms of trade have 
been unfavorable over recent decades.
Moreover, Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) 
find out two different outcomes for industries in 
countries that are (a) having or (b) not having ex-
cessive regulations. In responseto shocks, industries 
with high tariff barriers expand the existing firms 
while industries with low-entry barriers create 
new firms. In addition, countries facing high 
entry barrierstend to have only a few large firms 
−and industries are characterized by large sales 
turnover−,while countries with low entry barriers 
have many smaller firms. Thus, their results sug-
gest that regulations create distortion in industrial 
structure, increase industrial concentration, and 
influence the amount of participants to an indus-
try in case of external shocks. Similarly, Klapper, 
Laeven and Raghuram (2004) examine data on 
firms in Western and Eastern Europe and discover 
that entry regulations lead to less entry, especially 
in industries with naturally high-entry barriers. 
Furthermore, they find that excessive regulations 
deter the investment related to labor-intensive 
industries.
Transport infrastructure  
and regionalism
Good infrastructure −especially transport infras-
tructure such as roads, railways, and ports− will 
provide steadiness and assuredness in making trade 
investment in a country. Besides, solid infrastruc-
ture tends to lower the cost of trade and leads to 
sustainable intra-trade and investment. Thus said, it 
lays foundation for the formation of regionalism.
According to the World Trade Organization, 
WTO (2004), this sector is very crucial for moving 
goods and services from exporting to importing 
countries. Poor transport infrastructure or ineffi-
cient transport services are reflected in higher direct 
transport costs and longer time of delivery, while 
an improvement in the infrastructure of a country 
lowers the costs of trading. A study conducted by 
Limão and Venables (2001) shows that if there is an 
improved infrastructure in a country –moved from 
median point to top 25% of the total countries be-
ing surveyed−, it will cause a significant reduction 
on transportation cost up to 481 kilometers of over-
land travel and 3,989 kilometers of travel by sea. 
The shift of improvement will also causean increa-
sed volume of trade by 68%, which is equivalent 
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to being 2,005 kilometers closer to other countries. 
Meanwhile, countries facing inefficient transport 
services will experience higher overall transport 
costs. Poor quality of infrastructure increases to-
tal transport costs as it increases direct transport 
costs and the time of delivery. A study conducted 
by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) demonstrates 
that transport costs and lack of infrastructure wear 
down the potential income of local producers. 
The study performed by WTO (op. cit.) recognizes 
the negative impact of a lack of infrastructure on 
domestic income. Transportation infrastructure has 
been proved to have a pronounce effect on trade as 
it channels through the effect on the comparative 
advantage to trade of a country. 
Yeaple and Golub (2002) make quantifica-
tion that explains to which extent the difference 
in government infrastructure is affecting the exis-
ting Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at the sectoral 
level. They found that road infrastructure provision 
contributes as a significant factor in productivity 
growth of a sector and production specialization 
of a country. Moreover, the road infrastructure 
turns out to be significant not only as a factor 
affecting productivity growth in the transportation 
equipment sector, but also as a factor influencing 
the process of specialization in the production of 
textiles and apparel. 
Industrialization and regionalism
By definition, industrialization means the process 
whereby a society or country (or region) transforms 
itself from a primarily agricultural society into 
one based on the manufacturing of goods and 
services. Individual manual labor is often replaced 
by mechanized mass production and craftsmen 
are replaced by assembly lines. Characteristics of 
industrialization include the use of technological 
innovation to solve problems as opposed to supers-
tition or dependency upon conditions outside hu-
man control −such as the weather− as well as more 
efficient division of labor and economic growth. In-
dustrialization is a historical phase and experience. 
It is the overall change in circumstances accompan-
ying the movement of population and resources 
from primary production activities to manufactu-
ring production and associated services. In relation 
with regionalism, industrialization in developing 
countries creates mechanization for the parts 
and components that are being channeled from 
the developed countries. Regionally speaking, 
the industrialization process will help to enhance 
the region like a factory for the overall product 
fragmentation process. For East Asia, the example 
of Japan’s production networks to the Southeast 
Asian countries can be taken into account .Japan 
is widely known as the producer of highly value 
added engine parts and components, but actua-
lly, the entire production process includes several 
South-East Asian countries: Indonesia is responsible 
for assembling gasoline engines and horns; Philip-
pines specializes in making transmission and com-
bination meters; Malaysia takes part to assemble 
engine parts and condensers; Thailand assembles 
diesel engines and air conditioning systems. This 
entire process of production networks is spurred 
by the industrialization in the South-East Asian 
countries (Watanabe, 2008).
Population and regionalism
Big population serves well not only for the demand 
for the goods from trade but also as supply of labor 
for the industrialization process. Indeed, it creates 
sustainable paths toward regionalism. Looking at 
the literature, the effect of population on trade is 
a bit equivocal.
Matyas (1997) finds that population has the 
positive tendency of raising trade volumes and the 
level in which it produces gains from specializa-
tion. On the other hand, Dell`Ariccia (1999) finds 
a negative relation between population and the 
volume of trade. In addition, Bergstrand (1989) 
reports positive effect of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita on trade. He describes a negative 
GDP per capita coefficient in a way that the product 
group which is subject to the estimation is not 
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capital intensive but labor intensive. Since higher 
population numbers decrease GDP per capita on a 
labor intensive basis, it can be seen a negative rela-
tionship between population and trade flows.
According to nuroglu (2010) who studies 
the six big economies of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), the impact of population 
on trade will differ as it depends on the length of 
period of estimation (short-term vs. long-term). 
In the short run, population may have a positive 
impact on trade flows as it may raise the number 
of labor force, the level of specialization, and im-
ply more products to export. However, in the long 
run, a bigger population has more possibilities to 
decrease income per capita, which make every in-
dividual to be poorer, and, therefore, it may cause 
production and exports to decrease. In addition, 
lower income per capita tends to decrease the 
demand for imports as well. Having said this, diffe-
rent results across period and region can be seen 
when measuring the effect of population on trade. 
Hence, it creates different conclusions.
Education and regionalism
Policies concerning enhancement in the field of 
education have long been known and have played 
a significant role in development. A high-quality 
human resource development is regarded as the 
genuine product of education that can improve 
any strategy related to competitiveness. That being 
said, good education is the key to reach economic 
growth and to escape from poverty. 
Some developing countries have been suc-
cessful in attracting FDI due to qualified human 
skills. In the East Asian context, the sound policy 
that promotes education can eventually diminish 
income gaps between the Northeast and Southeast 
Asian countries. The fact that product fragmenta-
tion is becoming a trend in this region also serves 
to the regional convergence. As stated by Jones 
and Kierzkowski (2001), fragmentation increases 
the wage rate in countries where labor is a relatively 
abundant production factor, while it lowers the 
wage rate in countries where capital is abundant. 
This eventually equalizes the wage rate between 
two countries in the long term. This equalization 
in wage is true if the educational gap among the 
countries becomes reduced and less significant.
METHODOLOGY
This essay employs a fixed effect model in panel 
data. The model can be specified as follows:
Yit= Xitβ + λt + ηi +εit t=1,..., T i=1,...,N [1]
λt and ηi are time and individual specific effects 
respectively, x is a vector of the explanatory varia-
bles, (i) is the time component of the panel, (N) 
is the cross-section dimension (or the number of 
cross-section observations), and N x T is the total 
number of observations. The procedure consists in 
running the　models in order to have a consistent 
estimator for the β coefficients, and the model 
(fixed or random) choice depends on the hypo-
thesis assumed for the relationship between the 
error-term (εit ) and theregressors (xit). The static 
panel data analysis developed in the empirical sec-
tion of the paper was based on two　basic panel 
models: the fixed (FE) and the random (RE) effect 
models. The FE estimator uses a transformation in 
order to remove the unobserved effects (αi) and 
any time-constant explanatory variable. A general 
representation of a FE model is:
i t i i t i i ty x        [2]
Where i= 1,...N and t= 1,...T , where (x) represents 
the explanatory variables, (y) is the dependent 
variable and (εit ) the error term.
If the average over time is considered:
it iti iity x        [3]
Subtracting (14) from (15) for each (t):
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( )it itit i it itity y x x        [4]
or   it itiity x               [4a]
The FE transformation is called the within 
transformation and the FE estimator (or the wi-
thin estimator), which is the ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimation of equation (4a), the pooled OLS. 
Under the assumption of strict exogeneity for the 
explanatory variables (E(eit / xit , ai) = 0) the FE es-
timator is unbiased. If any explanatory variable is 
constant over time for all (i), it is swept away by 
the FE transformation ( 0)itx = the OLS estimation 
by FE also requires that the errors are homosedastic 
and serially uncorrelated over time.
The RE estimator is more adequate if it is 
assumed that the unobserved effect is not co-
rrelated with　all the explanatory variables, and 
the estimation is carried on by a generalized least 
square (GLS) estimation. The equation representing 
the RE model is:
y xit it= β +β +α +ε0 i i it                           [5]
If the unobserved effect (αi) is thought as unco-
rrelated with each explanatory variable (xit),using 
a transformation (FE estimator) to eliminate (αi) 
will result in inefficient estimators. Estimation　of 
equation (5) for (αi) uncorrelated with the explana-
tory variables is the RE model. If the composite error 
terms are defined as (υit = α + ε), equation [5] 
can be written:
y xit it= β +β +α +ε0 i i it+it = t i it it       [6]
In this case, it is necessary to remember 
that ( itu ) are serially correlated over time and the 
pooled　OLS estimator is not the choice since it 
ignores the positive serial correlation, and the idea 
is to use the GLS to take into account to resolve 
the serial correlation problem. The GLS estimation 
will be a pooled OLS estimation of the transformed 
model, which can be represented as follows:
0 (1 ) ( ) ( )itit i i t i t iiy y x x u u           it   
   
0 (1 ) ( ) ( )itit i i t i t iiy y x x u u           it           [7]
Where 2 2 21 ( )T          for 
( 0)itx it  
0 1 
One of the advantages of using such trans-
formation and the RE model is that it allows ex-
planatory variables that are constant over time. By 
examining equation (1), one can relate the RE esti-
mator (pooled OLS known as POLS) and FE where 
the POLS is obtained for the case where λ = 0 (the 
unobserved effect, αi is not important) while the 
FE is the estimator for λ = 1. The choice　between 
the FE and the RE estimators is based on whether 
the unobserved effects (αi) can beconsidered as 
parameters to be estimated, or as an outcome 
of a random variable, suggesting the use of aFE 
or a RE model respectively. Since the time period 
(1998-2007) exceed the individual observations 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, China, 
Japan and Korea), the fixed effect model is con-
sidered the most appropriate method (Nachrowi 
& Usman, 2008). Thus said, this essay formulate 
specific model as follows:
    
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3... ...it it t t t N Nt i i i t iT itOpen X W W W W Z Z Z Z e                         
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3... ...it it t t t N Nt i i i t iT itOpen X W W W W Z Z Z Z e                          
       [8]
Following Hastiadi (2010) and Hastiadi 
(2011), the formula can be defined as:
Where:
Openit = Regionalism for time t and country i 
Xit = Independent Variables (ASEAn4 + CJK’s 
railways, tax, democracy, governance, 
industry, gross school enrolment rate, 
inflation and population)
Wit and Zit are dummy variables which are defined 
as follows:
Wit = 1 for country i, where i = Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, China, 
Japan, Korea.
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3. .it it t t t N Nt i i i t iT itOpen X Z Z Z Z e                     
y xit i= β +β +α +ε0 i i it
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  = 0 for others
Zit   = 1 for Period t where t = 1998,  
  2000..., 2007.
  = 0 for others
The following are the explanations for the 
variables as it is replicated from Hastiadi (2010; 
2011):
 
 (a) the study uses the proxy of trade 
openness (net export per GDP) for regio-
nalism. The variable of openness is used 
to represent regionalism, since regiona-
lism creates openness to some sectors of 
economy. Openness here functions as a 
dependent variable that is determined by 
some independent variables. (b) Railways 
as transported goods (million ton/km) is 
used to explain physical infrastructure 
readiness. Pairing up with this variable is 
the gross school enrolment rate, which 
serves as the basis for human capital 
infrastructure. Gross enrollment ratio is 
the ratio of total enrollment, regardless 
of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the 
level of education shownSound infras-
tructure (both physical and human) will 
provide steadiness and assuredness in 
making investment among members. 
In other words, good infrastructure will 
only lead to a sustainable intra-trade and 
investment that serve as the basis of EAR. 
(c) Democracy is measured by means of-
the index of democracy produced by Po-
lity IV project data set. Democratization 
is expected to open-up new avenues of 
support for free trade vis-à-vis regiona-
lism. (d) The next variable is the taxation 
policy, whereby the higher the rate, the 
more it will diminish the prospects of 
EAR. (e) Another meaningful variable is 
governance, which is measured by the six 
governance indicators estimated by Kauf-
mann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008). These 
indices describe various aspects of the 
governance structures of a broad cross 
section of countries, including measures 
of Voice and Accountability, Political sta-
bility, Government Effectiveness, Regula-
tory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption. In general, the Governance 
index provides explanatory power to 
explain the capability and quality of go-
vernance from each member country. The 
better indicator a country has, the more it 
has the chance to capitalize regionalism. 
(f) The macroeconomic variable, which is 
represented by inflation, creates ambi-
guous expectation. High inflation might 
deter the formation of EAR since the very 
beginning, but some scholars prove the 
other way around. One of argument su-
pporting the latter proposition is given 
by Cohen (1997) who argued that the in-
flationary policy (high inflation) resulting 
from the government action will tend to 
raise the obstacle to private investors, 
which –in turn– demand for greater inte-
gration. The loss of discretion in the fiscal 
and monetary policy will then reduced 
the risk of uncertainty. (g) Large market 
together with the ongoing industriali-
zation process sums up the last aspects 
of EAR formation. The sheer size of the 
East Asian population creates not only 
the potential demand for the goods tra-
ded in the region, but also the supply of 
labor force and the low absolute level of 
wages. In other words, Lewis’s unlimited 
supply of labor will persist longer in East 
Asia. The process will lead to an upward 
trend towards industrialization (value 
added as percentage from GDP) in the 
region. The trend is very important since 
homogeneity in industrialization among 
countries in the region will smooth the 
progress of EAR.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As Hastiadi (2010; 2011) failed to give deep and 
concise analysis of the variables used, this study 
aims to present a comprehensive analysis of the 
regression. Table 1 presents the regression result 
from the panel data model. The railways (as a proxy 
of transport infrastructures)give positive coeffi-
cient for openness as expected. The percentage of 
growth of railways in kilometers tends to raise the 
net export per GDP (Openness) by 0.12 point. The 
result confirms the importance of transportation 
infrastructure to create greater possibilities for 
regionalism. The negative sign of the coefficient 
for tax describes the opposite relation between 
corporate tax rate and the future prospect of EAR: 
the higher the rate, the more it will deteriorate 
the EAR. The percentage of tax rate being raised 
tends to lower the likelihood of openness by 0.02 
point. The negative sign of democracy gives the 
conclusion that democratic environment hampers 
the possibility of joining any regional trade scheme. 
With democracy, delivering a policy would become 
difficult since the government has to meet the 
expectation of stakeholders. Trade liberalization is 
surely a controversial topic that can only find po-
litical resistance from people who find themselves 
to be potentially affected by such policy. 
Fortunately, the magnitude is not very high since 
one (1) point rise in the index only lowers the ten-
dency of openness by 0.004 point. The variable of 
industry yields positive coefficient in which it can 
be concluded that the trend towards industrializa-
tion in East Asia has opened the chance of making 
regional grouping. One point rise in this variable 
will –most likely– raise the tendency of openness 
by 0.04. The variable of population has not only 
positive, but also the biggest coefficient. Indeed, 
population is regarded as the most important va-
riable that serves as a foundation towards EAR. One 
point rise in population will raise the likelihood of 
openness by 0.86. The variable of education also 
shows a positive coefficient. One point rise in the 
coefficient will help to raise the possibility of EAR 
by 0.01 point. The insignificant role of inflation 
for EAR is expected due to the ambiguity given. 
Governance gives us positive and significant im-
pact to openness. One point rise in the governance 
index will raise the tendency of openness by 0.26 
point. This means that corruption control, voice 
and accountability, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness, political stability, and rule of law play 
important roles for EAR. 
Table 1.
 Factors affecting openness
Dependent Variable: OPENNES
Independent 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
LOG(RAILWAYS) 0.115860 2.059379**
TAX -0.029831 -3.530943***
DEMOCRACY -0.004282 -2.051852**
GOVERNANCE 0.257508 3.860438***
INDUSTRY 0.049930 4.861010***
LOG(POPULATION) 0.863634 2.154852**
GROSS EDUCATION 0.011445 2.217493**
InFLATIOn -0.001545 -0.441719
R-squared 0.99251
Adjusted R-squared  0.98975
note: Statistical significance is indicated by *(10%), 
**(5%), and ***(1%).
Source: Own work
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It can be said that regionalism in East Asia is driven 
by the market or, in other words, the bottom-up 
process of regionalism. Notwithstanding, the pro-
cess should be matched with the top-down process 
which assembles leaders and policy makers into one 
table of negotiation. This is very important since 
the present scheme will mount serious problems 
in the future. High regional export concentration 
countries, high inflation and high tax rate in some 
ASEAN countries will pose serious threat with the 
absence of sound policy. Efforts to bring East Asian 
regionalism to its path is not like it has never been 
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done before, but it has not been effectively done. 
The principles of a good policy are credibility, fle-
xibility and political legitimation. Rule of law could 
create credibility if it is widely known and well un-
derstood by the public. With credibility, it will be 
easier to handle any economic turbulence with the 
policy instrument that is controlled by the econo-
mic authority. Credibility could function more when 
there is a transparent and accountable framewor-
kwhich strengthens political legitimation. Effective 
policy would merge-up if the policy makers have 
the ability to react promptly in every unpreceden-
ted shock. Credible policy makers are those who 
make the policy with respect for transparency. With 
the high-level transparency, any economic shock 
would be easily diminished. Without transparen-
cy, every policy with regards to economic target 
and fiscal rule would become obsolete, since the 
public could not compare between the target and 
the realization. Moreover, the political legitimation 
would become very important since the policies 
being made should reflect regional consensus. This 
–in turn– creates balance of power and also general 
responsibilities which could reduce the negative 
effect from the uncoordinated policy.
As Hastiadi (2011) argues, East Asian Re-
gionalism will help the region to endure future 
challenges as it would lead to a more intense pro-
duction network. Having said this, institution-led 
regionalism should replace the existing market-
led regionalism. It is important not only to have 
East Asia as one block of countries with powerful 
political and economic abilities, but also to create 
sustainability with the shared welfare among the 
members. As the former Indonesian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas said in 2001, ASEAn Plus 
Three is equal to peace plus prosperity, since it 
can contribute substantively to the achievement 
and maintenance of sustained and sustainable 
peace, stability, security and welfare in this part 
of the world.
From a static panel data simulation, it is 
found that sound transportation infrastructure, 
good governance, competitive taxation policy, si-
zeable market, good education, democracy and the 
trend towards industrialization are the main factors 
that serve as building blocks for EAR. These findings 
are coherent with the study conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank in 2006, which identifies four 
solid pillars for the East Asian regional cooperation 
and integration: (a) trade and investment; (b) mo-
ney and finance; (c) infrastructure and connectivity; 
and (d) regional public goods.
Having identified that the factors determi-
ning regionalism in East Asia should be equally 
matched by actual implementation on the field by 
the East Asian leaders, the question then arises: 
will they be ready to go through the path towards 
regionalism?
Recent study by Capannelli in 2011 may help 
to answer the question:
 Given the relatively high degree of global 
integration that characterizes Asian econo-
mies, the prosperity that can be generated 
by a more deeply integrated region is to be 
shared not only by individual Asian countries 
but with the entire world. Asian political 
leaders should be ready, however, to trans-
late into action their declarations of intent 
regarding closer regionalism, create proper 
structures and new institutions to start a top-
down approach to regional integration, as 
well as mobilize sufficient financial resources 
to ensure that future initiatives will be solid 
and sustainable. The 1,000 Asian opinion 
leaders who replied to the ADB survey are 
largely confident that the benefits of regio-
nalism outweigh its costs by a substantial 
margin. They are part of an expanding and 
vibrant knowledge community which provi-
des intellectual support to the progressive 
move towards closer Asian integration. The 
challenge facing the creation of a regional 
economic community is to bring this enthu-
siasm to the grassroots level and give new 
impetus to the bottom-up approach by 
involving the civil society in the process.
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To wrap up, EAR will enable the region to cope 
with the future challenges of globalization and re-
main internationally competitive. An integrated East 
Asia would lead to the advancement in economies 
of scale, fuller development of production networks. 
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